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EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION, 
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER, AND 
SOVEREIGN DEBT 
ADAM FEIBELMAN* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Until recently, debates over sovereign debt have primarily focused on 
whether and how sovereigns in financial distress should be able to restructure 
their obligations.1 More recently, however, since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s 
regime in Iraq, a new topic has gained much attention: whether sovereigns’ 
creditors should be able to enforce obligations that were “odious” or 
“illegitimate” at the time they were made.2 Obligations are arguably odious or 
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 1. The literature concerning sovereign indebtedness and general issues of debt relief is vast. See, 
e.g., DEBT AND THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (Joshua D. Aronson ed., 1979); DEBT, 
STABILIZATION, AND DEVELOPMENT (Calvo et al. eds., 1986); ANALYTICAL ISSUES IN DEBT (Frenkel 
et al. eds., 1989); DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT AND THE WORLD ECONOMY (Jeffrey D. Sachs ed., 
1989); NOURIEL ROUBINI & BRAD SETSER, BAILOUTS OR BAIL-INS? (2004); Jeremy Bulow & 
Kenneth Rogoff, A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt, 97 J. POL. ECON. 155 (1989); 
Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, Debt With Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical 
Analysis, 48 REV. ECON. STUDS. 289 (1981); Jeffrey D. Sachs, A Strategy for Efficient Debt Reduction, 4 
J. ECON. PERSP. 19 (1990). 
The most recent chapter in this literature has focused on the ability of holdout creditors to 
complicate sovereign-debt restructurings. See, e.g., Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Inside the Black 
Box: How Should a Sovereign Bankruptcy Framework Be Structured?, 53 EMORY L.J. 763 (2004); 
William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of Creditors, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 1 (2004); Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51 
EMORY L.J. 1317 (2002); Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, The Political Economy of Altering Standard 
Form Contracts: A Case Study, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007); Anne Krueger, First Deputy 
Managing Dir., Int’l Monetary Fund, Address to the Indian Council for Research on International 
Economic Relations, A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring (Dec. 20, 2001), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2001/122001.htm (last visited May 9, 2007). 
 2. Articles in this volume are part of this growing literature. See also Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu 
Gulati & Robert B. Thompson, The Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56 DUKE L.J. 1201 (2007); Adam 
Feibelman, Contract, Priority, and Odious Debt, 85 N.C. L. REV. 727 (2007); Anna Gelpern, What Iraq 
and Argentina Might Learn from Each Other, 6 CHI J. INT’L L. 391 (2005); Christoph G. Paulus, 
“Odious Debts” vs. Debt Trap: A Realistic Help?, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L. L. 83 (2005); Raghuram Rajan, 
Odious or Just Malodorous?, FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT, Dec. 2004, at 54; Joseph Stiglitz, Odious 
Rulers, Odious Debts, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 2003, at 42; Patricia Adams, Iraq’s Odious Debts, 
Policy Analysis, No. 526 (Cato Inst. 2004), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-526es.html (last 
visited May 9, 2007); Seema Jayachandran & Michael Kremer, Odious Debt, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 82 
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illegitimate if they were incurred in exchange for funds that provided no 
plausible value to their sovereign borrowers or were used to violate the rights of 
the citizens of those sovereigns.3 There appears to be general agreement that, in 
an ideal world, creditors should not be able to enforce such debts. Such 
obligations are presumably both inefficient and unjust to the citizens of the 
sovereign. Despite this general agreement in principle, writers and advocates 
disagree about whether it is possible for sovereigns to repudiate or discharge 
such obligations without undermining sovereigns’ access to capital.4 Those who 
believe it is possible to do so disagree about which mechanism or mechanisms 
would most effectively enable sovereigns to identify and repudiate such odious 
obligations. Some commentators have proposed ambitious, comprehensive 
approaches, including a public international institution that would effectively 
designate certain sovereign obligations or regimes as odious.5 Others have 
argued that a formal sovereign bankruptcy scheme6 or a private contractual 
arrangement7 would provide a better mechanism for odious debt relief. Other 
writers have argued, perhaps more modestly, that sovereigns can challenge 
enforcement of odious obligations pursuant to doctrines of public international 
law8 or private domestic law.9 
Expanding upon proposals to employ private domestic law as a strategy for 
addressing the problem of odious debt, this article focuses on two particular 
 
(2006); Ashfaq Khalfan et al., Advancing the Odious Debt Doctrine (Center for Int’l Sustainable 
Development Law, Working Paper No. COM/RES/ESJ, 2003) available at http://www.cisdl.org/ 
pdf/debtentire.pdf. Within the last few years, officials of Iraq, Nigeria, and Ecuador have raised the 
possibility that some debts owed by their countries are odious. See Feibelman, supra note 2, at nn.35–
36. 
 3. It will often be debatable whether the extension of any particular funds actually provided a 
benefit to the sovereign. This is especially true, for example, if the funds supported foolhardy or 
gratuitous expenditures (say, for example, the building of a vanity palace). This article assumes that 
there are some uses of funds (say, for example, direct transfer to a government official’s private bank 
account abroad) that can be said to provide no benefit to the sovereign. For a more extensive 
discussion of this question, see Feibelman, supra note 2, at 758–63. 
 4. Compare, e.g., Rajan, supra note 2 (expressing concerns about the financial consequences 
sovereigns might face if they repudiate obligations) with Jayachandran & Kremer, supra note 2 
(proposing an institutional mechanism that would enable sovereigns to repudiate obligations without 
foreclosing the opportunity to borrow subsequently). 
 5. See, e.g., Jayachandran & Kremer, supra note 2. See also Jubilee Iraq, About Us, 
http://www.jubileeiraq.org/aboutus.htm (last visited May 9, 2007) (promoting an arbitration tribunal to 
repudiate odious debt owed by Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein). 
 6. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.  See also NOREENA HERTZ, THE DEBT THREAT 187–
94 (2004) (“[D]omestic bankruptcy . . . provides us with a good basis on which to design a mechanism 
for determining which sovereign debts are unpayable or illegitimate, and how debtors and creditors 
should be treated as a result.”); Stiglitz, supra note 2, at 42 (arguing that a bankruptcy system for 
sovereigns could provide relief from obligations incurred by outlaw or odious regimes pursuant to rules 
established by the United Nations). 
 7. In theory, creditors and sovereigns could bargain to ensure that sovereigns do not incur odious 
debt. Sovereigns could promise not to incur such obligations (or risk default of other obligations), and 
creditors could bargain for the right to designate, by vote, debts as odious. See generally Feibelman, 
supra note 2. 
 8. See, e.g., Khalfan et al., supra note 2; Adams, supra note 2. 
 9. See generally Buchheit et al., supra note 1. 
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doctrines of lender liability—equitable subordination and fraudulent transfer.10 
Although doctrines of equitable subordination and fraudulent transfer do not 
appear to have been applied to sovereign debt by U.S. courts in the past, both 
should be available to sovereigns’ creditors in most if not all U.S. jurisdictions. 
To successfully assert the doctrine of equitable subordination, for example, 
complaining creditors will have to show that target creditors acted inequitably 
and that the complaining creditors were harmed by the inequitable conduct. 
When a creditor extends debt to a sovereign borrower that provides no benefit 
to the sovereign, it imposes harms on the sovereign’s other creditors.  Because 
the target creditors will presumably not be insiders in any meaningful sense, 
however, the bar for succeeding under the doctrine will be very high; it will be 
necessary to show that the target creditors engaged in egregious behavior. 
Knowingly extending credit of no arguable benefit to a sovereign debtor should 
satisfy this requirement.  
If courts employ a narrow definition of fraudulent or inequitable behavior 
pursuant to these doctrines, then lenders should have relatively clear guidance 
about what kinds of transactions might trigger liability. Defining odious debt 
narrowly in this way will discipline lenders from extending credit that provides 
no value to the sovereign. It should also create incentives for creditors to insist 
on proof from their sovereign debtors that funds they lend will be used for some 
arguably beneficial purpose. This would effectively create safe harbors for 
legitimate lenders. 
This article addresses practical, doctrinal concerns as well as normative 
implications of employing theories such as equitable subordination and 
fraudulent transfer to respond to the problem of odious debt. These doctrines 
arguably capture the precise harm of odious debt better than other doctrines of 
private law. More important, these doctrines can be invoked by stakeholders—
especially creditors—who have been harmed by the creation of odious debt. 11 
Employing these doctrines, therefore, harnesses the interests and skills of 
creditors who extend non-odious debt to pursue those creditors who act 
inequitably. This may be especially valuable when sovereigns do not have good 
incentives to repudiate their own odious obligations. Unleashing the doctrines 
will create some costs, but these costs may be offset by the benefits of reducing 
the amount of odious debt outstanding. Part II briefly describes the doctrines of 
equitable subordination and fraudulent transfer and explains how they might be 
employed to subordinate or avoid sovereign obligations. Part III sets forth the 
normative dimension of the argument. It argues that if creditors are able to 
assert these doctrines and if courts apply them narrowly, the cost of potentially 
 
 10. Doctrines of fraudulent transfer and equitable subordination are deeply related and, in many 
circumstances, are interchangeable. See generally Robert Charles Clark, The Duties of the Corporate 
Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REV. 505 (1977) (discussing how such doctrines as fraudulent 
transfer, equitable subordination, and corporate veil-piercing overlap with each other). See also infra 
notes 12–51 and accompanying text. 
 11. Sovereigns may be able to assert these doctrines as well, but this article focuses on the role of 
creditors. 
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odious debt should increase, the amount of odious debt extended should 
decrease, and the cost of credit that clearly falls outside the scope of liability 
may decrease. 
II 
THE DOCTRINAL MOVE 
A. The Doctrines  
1. Equitable Subordination 
The American doctrine of equitable subordination12 enables a court to 
subordinate a creditor’s claim or interest when the creditor has acted 
inequitably and harmed its debtor or the debtor’s other creditors.13 The doctrine 
is conventionally, if erroneously, understood to be exclusive to bankruptcy law.14 
Section 510(c) of the United States Bankruptcy Code provides that a court may 
1) under principles of equitable subordination, subordinate for purposes of 
distribution all or part of an allowed claim to all or part of another allowed claim or all 
or part of an allowed interest to all or part of another allowed interest; or 2) order that 
any lien securing such a subordinated claim be transferred to the estate.15 
If a court subordinates a claim or interest pursuant to this provision, the claim 
or interest is generally not discharged; rather, its priority is reduced so that 
other claims or interests must be satisfied before it.16 However, a court of equity 
generally has discretion to disallow or avoid a claim or interest that might 
otherwise be subordinated.17 Furthermore, the practical effect of subordinating 
a claim or interest is often to deny any recovery to the holder of the claim or 
interest. 
Section 510(c) codifies a doctrine of bankruptcy law that was articulated by 
the Supreme Court in the 1930s in two important cases: Pepper v. Litton18 and 
 
 12. Equitable subordination is a doctrine of lender liability. Lender liability is itself actually a 
collection of legal claims and defenses that have historically been applied to lenders in different 
contexts, arising from express or implied contractual duties, tort law, equitable principles, or fiduciary 
duties. See Adam Feibelman, Commercial Lending and the Separation of Banking and Commerce, 75 
U. CIN. L. REV. 943, 971 (2007). For a classic critique of lender-liability doctrines, see Daniel R. Fischel, 
The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE L.J. 131 (1989). 
 13. See, e.g., In re Mobile Steel, 563 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1977). See also David Gray Carlson, The 
Logical Structure of Fraudulent Transfers and Equitable Subordination, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157 
(2003); Adam J. Levitin, Rough Justice? The Nature and Limits of Equitable Subordination (Social 
Science Research Network Working Paper, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=900444. For an 
early important work on the topic, see Aza S. Herzog & Joel B. Zweibel, The Equitable Subordination 
of Claims in Bankruptcy, 15 VAND. L REV. 83 (1961). 
 14. See infra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 15. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2006). 
 16. See id. See also Carlson, supra note 13, at 199–200 (citing E. Minerals & Chems. Co. v. Mahan, 
225 F.3d 330, 338 (3d Cir. 2000); Levitin, supra note 13, at 2. 
 17. See infra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. 
 18. 308 U.S. 295 (1939). In Pepper, a controlling shareholder of the debtor caused the debtor to 
confess liability to a salary claim asserted by the shareholder. Id. at 296–302. The Court found that the 
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Taylor v. Gas & Electric Co.19 Prior to these cases, it appears that U.S. courts 
had occasionally subordinated the claims of creditors for inequitable conduct.20 
In Pepper and Litton, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the doctrine 
ultimately derives from Anglo American equity jurisprudence. American 
bankruptcy courts have historically had the powers enjoyed by courts of 
equity,21 and early courts engaging in equitable subordination did so pursuant to 
basic principles of equity.22 These equitable principles have helped define the 
scope of the doctrine since it was formally recognized as a part of bankruptcy 
law. In fact, the legislative history of § 510(c) explicitly acknowledges that the 
provision should be understood as granting bankruptcy courts the power to 
subordinate claims and interests on any grounds recognized in equity.23 
Given this broad scope, it is not surprising that the doctrine of equitable 
subordination has been applied in a wide variety of factual contexts. 
Paradigmatic instances of equitable subordination involve creditors who are 
insiders to a debtor corporation—usually officers, directors, managing 
shareholders, or corporate parents of the debtor.24 Under the Code, an insider 
of a corporation includes any “person in control of the debtor.”25 Thus, 
otherwise independent creditors who exercise a high degree of control over 
 
shareholder-creditor had engaged in inequitable conduct warranting subordination or disallowance. Id. 
at 312–13. 
 19. 306 U.S. 307 (1939). See also Miller v. Borton, 67 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1933). See generally 
Carlson, supra note 13, at 198. The codified rule was initially articulated by the Fifth Circuit in In re 
Mobile Steel, 563 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 20. See, e.g., Miller, 67 F.2d 792; In re Star Car & Foundry Co., 2 F.2d 53 (4th Cir. 1924); Spencer v. 
Lowe, 198 F. 961 (8th Cir. 1912); In re Ewald & Brainard, 135 F. 168 (N.D. Iowa 1905). 
 21. See Andrew DeNatale & Prudence Abram, The Doctrine of Equitable Subordination as 
Applied to Nonmanagement Creditors, 40 BUS. LAW 417, 419 (1985); Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 13, 
at 83–85; Rafael Ignacio Pardo, Note, Beyond the Limits of Equity Jurisprudence: No-Fault Equitable 
Subordination, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1489, 1490 (2000). See also Pepper, 308 U.S. at 307 (“[T]he 
bankruptcy court in passing on allowance of claims sits as a court of equity.”). Questions about the 
jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts have been complicated since the Supreme Court’s decision in N. 
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). The discussion here does not 
purport to address any questions of jurisdiction under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. Rather, the point 
here is that equitable subordination originally made its way into bankruptcy law through the 
substantive content of nonbankruptcy equity jurisprudence, and the bankruptcy doctrine still 
incorporates basic equitable principles. 
 22. See In re Mobile Steel, 563 F.2d at 698–99; Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934). See also 
Carlson, supra note 13, at 208 & n.158. 
 23. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at § 510 (1978) (“[Section 510(c)] is intended to codify case law . . . . The 
Bankruptcy court remains a court of equity . . . . The court’s power is broader than the general doctrine 
of equitable subordination and encompasses subordination on any equitable grounds.”); see generally 
Levitin, supra note 13, at 4–6; Pardo, supra note 21, at 1491. 
 24. See Carlson, supra note 13, at 198–99 (“Most often insider creditors are the ones punished by 
equitable subordination.”); DeNatale & Abram, supra note 21, at 424 (“Generally, application of 
equitable subordination has been limited to the claims of management creditors . . . .”); Herzog & 
Zweibel, supra note 13, at 101–02. For a very early case in this category, see Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. 
Marbury, 91 U.S. 587 (1875) (setting aside claims by directors). For early cases involving parent 
corporations, see Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939) and Forbush Co. v. Bartley, 
78 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1935). More recent cases involving parent corporations include Ansel Props., Inc. 
v. Nutri/Sys. of Fla. Assocs., 178 B.R. 645 (E.D. Pa. 1995). 
 25. 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(B)(iii) (2006); see also Pardo, supra note 21, at n.12. 
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their debtors have been characterized as insiders of a corporation for these 
purposes.26 Insiders generally have some degree of influence or direct power 
over the actions of a corporation; this is one important reason that the law 
generally imposes fiduciary responsibilities on them. 
The fact that a creditor is an insider is not sufficient to warrant 
subordination of its claims. The creditor must also have engaged in some 
inequitable conduct that caused harm to other stakeholders. Thus, courts have 
subordinated claims based on factors including mismanagement, 
undercapitalization, fraud, spoliation, or some combination of these.27 A 
common underlying logic of most of these cases is that the offending party has 
unreasonably shifted risk to other parties.28 
If being an insider is not sufficient to trigger subordination, neither is it a 
necessary factor.29 Courts have subordinated claims by non-insider creditors 
who made fraudulent misrepresentations to help induce other creditors to lend 
to a common debtor.30 In the well-known case of In re Bowman Hardware & 
Electric Co., for example, a creditor faced subordination of its claims because it 
had encouraged the debtor not to include certain obligations on its books.31 
Courts have also subordinated claims that were based on illegal conduct or 
violation of a regulation.32 Generally, the misconduct of non-insider creditors 
must be particularly bad to be characterized as inequitable.33 Courts tend to 
require gross misconduct or egregious behavior before subordinating claims of 
parties who are not insiders.34 
2. Fraudulent Transfer 
The doctrine of fraudulent transfer is closely related to equitable 
subordination.35 Fraudulent transfers are avoidable under federal bankruptcy 
 
 26. See, e.g., Comstock v. Group of Inst’l Investors, 335 U.S. 211 (1948); In re Process-Manz Press, 
Inc., 236 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Ill. 1964). See also DeNatale & Abram, supra note 21, at 432–45; Herzog & 
Zweibel, supra note 13, at 102–12. 
 27. See Pardo, supra note 21, at n.12. In fact, the inequitable conduct does not have to relate 
directly to the creditor’s claim. See In re Enron, 333 B.R. 205 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 28. See, e.g., DeNatale & Abram, supra note 21, at 446–47 (citing In re Carolee’s Combine, Inc., 3 
Bankr. 324 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980)). 
 29. See Carlson, supra note 13, at 199; DeNatale & Abram, supra note 21, at 419, 429–47 
(discussing cases in which courts have subordinated the claims of nonmanagement creditors who 
engaged in fraud, exercised a degree of control over their debtors, or engaged in other inequitable 
conduct such as violating the automatic stay of bankruptcy law). See also Enron, 333 B.R. 205 
(subordinating claims by creditors without suggesting that they were insiders). 
 30. See, e.g., L & M Realty Corp. v. Leo, 249 F.2d 688 (4th Cir. 1957). See generally Herzog & 
Zweibel, supra note 13, at 99. 
 31. 67 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1933). 
 32. See, e.g., Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp. v. United States, 151 F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1945); In re 
Sayman’s, Inc., 15 Bankr. 229 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981). See generally Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 13, 
at 101. 
 33. See Pardo, supra note 21, at n.12. 
 34. See Carlson, supra note 13, at 199; William L. Medford, Debt-to-Equity Recharacterization: Is It 
More Than Equitable Subordination’s Evil Twin? 23 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26 (Nov. 2004). 
 35. See Carlson, supra note 13; Clark, supra note 10. 
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law36 and are prohibited under state law in every state. Many states have 
enacted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA),37 which provides that 
[a] transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent . . . if the debtor 
made the transfer or incurred the obligation: (1) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or 
defraud any creditor of the debtor; or (2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent 
value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor: (i) was engaged or 
was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of 
the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or (ii) 
intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he [or she] 
would incur, debts beyond his [or her] ability to pay as they became due.38 
The primary remedy for fraudulent transfer is “avoidance of the transfer or 
obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy the [harmed] creditor’s claim.”39 As 
necessary, however, remedies may also include such actions as attachment of a 
transferred asset, injunctions against the transferee, and appointment of a 
receiver.40 
A paradigmatic example of fraudulent transfer involves a gift or donation by 
an insolvent debtor of some or all of its assets to a favored third party to avoid 
giving those assets to its creditors.41 Because proving actual intent to defraud 
can be challenging, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act incorporates a 
doctrine of constructive fraud.42 Thus, a transfer that is not an exchange for 
“reasonably equivalent”43 value may be constructively fraudulent if the 
transferor “was financially impaired, or rendered financially impaired, by the 
transaction.”44 Thus, fraudulent transfers usually occur when a debtor is 
insolvent or experiencing financial distress. But a debtor does not have to be 
insolvent to make a fraudulent transfer.45 Furthermore, transfers for value—that 
is, actual exchanges—can be fraudulent transfers if made for the purpose of 
hindering or defrauding creditors.46 
Over the last couple of decades, fraudulent transfer laws have been applied 
well beyond their traditional or paradigmatic contexts. Most notably, for 
example, creditors have challenged leveraged buyouts of their debtors as 
 
 36. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (2006). See also 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) (2006) (providing that a trustee 
may avoid certain transfers that are voidable under state fraudulent transfer laws). 
 37. See Carlson, supra note 13, at 167. 
 38. Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act § 4(a) (1984). 
 39. Id.  § 7(a)(1); Carlson, supra note 13, at 167–68. 
 40. See, e.g., In re Saylor, 178 B.R. 209 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995). 
 41. See Carlson, supra note 13, at 166–67 (distinguishing between fraudulent-transfer cases 
involving “exchanges” and “donations”); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent 
Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829, 829–36 (1985) (noting that the 
doctrine has its roots in the Statute of Elizabeth, adopted by England in the sixteenth century). 
 42. See Barry L. Zaretsky, Fraudulent Transfer Law as the Arbiter of Unreasonable Risk, 46 S.C. L. 
REV. 1165, 1165–67 (1995); Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act § 4(a)(2) (1984). 
 43. Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act § 4(a)(2) (1984). 
 44. Zaretsky, supra note 42, at 1166. 
 45. See id. at 1166 & n.23. 
 46. See id. at 1166 (noting that bona fide transferees who give value for an exchange are generally 
protected from liability). 
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fraudulent transfers.47 These transactions implicate the doctrine to the extent 
that they may impair the financial position of the target firm and may not 
involve exchange of equivalent value (especially when the buyout loans are 
secured by all of the firm’s assets). Although most courts have found that 
leveraged buyouts are not fraudulent transfers,48 at least some courts have been 
willing to evaluate these transactions as potentially fraudulent.49 These cases and 
others have led some writers to conclude that an animating purpose of 
fraudulent transfer law is to “regulate the permissible degree of risk” that 
debtors can take with funds they obtain from creditors.50 Thus, both fraudulent 
transfer and equitable subordination appear to be largely concerned with 
regulating unreasonable or unfair shifting of risks by one stakeholder to other 
stakeholders. 
Nonetheless, there are some notable differences between the doctrines of 
equitable subordination and fraudulent transfer. Perhaps most significantly, 
fraudulent-transfer doctrines tend to focus on the actions and motivations of a 
debtor—whether the debtor made a transfer to harm the interests of its 
creditors. In contrast, equitable subordination tends to focus on a creditor’s 
conduct—whether a creditor has taken action that harms the interests of other 
creditors. Furthermore, the conventional remedies that these doctrines 
provide—subordination and avoidance—are formally quite different.51 
In many circumstances, however, these two doctrines will serve essentially 
the same function and address essentially the same harm. This is especially true 
when a common debtor has colluded with a creditor to harm other creditors, 
which is often the case when either doctrine applies. As explained below, both 
doctrines should be implicated if a sovereign incurs odious debt. It is hard to say 
with any confidence which of the doctrines applies most directly to odious debt. 
This article tends to emphasize the application of equitable subordination to 
odious debt because it aims to draw attention to the conduct of creditors. In any 
event, carefully delineating the distinction between these doctrines is beyond 
the scope of this article. 
 
 47. See id. at 1178–92; Baird & Jackson, supra note 41, at 850–54. 
 48. See Bruce A. Markell, Following Zaretsky: Fraudulent Transfers and Unfair Risk, 75 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 317, 327 (2001). 
 49. See Zaretsky, supra note 42, at 1181–92. 
 50. Zaretsky, supra note 42, at 1173. See also Markell, supra note 48 (discussing Zaretsky’s 
approach and applying it to evaluate absolute priority); R. Stephan Painter, Jr., Subprime Lending, 
Suboptimal Bankruptcy: A Proposal to Amend §§ 522(F)(1)(B) and 548(A)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy 
Code to Protect Subprime Mortgage Borrowers and Their Unsecured Creditors, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 81, 
125–26 (2006)(discussing Zaretsky’s approach). 
 51. See supra notes 12 (equitable subordination) and 39 (fraudulent transfer) and accompanying 
text. David Carlson has argued that equitable subordination is properly understood as a remedy for 
fraudulent transfers. Carlson, supra note 13, at 200 (“[E]quitable subordination is simply a fraudulent 
transfer remedy.”). 
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B. The Move 
A sovereign’s creditors should be able to employ doctrines of fraudulent 
transfer or equitable subordination to avoid or subordinate odious obligations 
owed by the sovereign to other creditors. However, these creditors cannot 
assert either doctrine pursuant to bankruptcy law. Sovereigns cannot file for 
bankruptcy under U.S. bankruptcy law; in fact, there is no bankruptcy regime 
available to sovereigns.52 Although bankruptcy law is unavailable to them, 
however, creditors of a sovereign should be able to assert doctrines of equitable 
subordination or fraudulent transfer pursuant to state law in federal district 
courts or in state courts in most U.S. jurisdictions. 
1. Equitable Subordination 
If the power to subordinate a party’s claim or interest in bankruptcy 
originally derived from general equitable principles,53 these general principles 
presumably continue to be viable aspects of equity jurisprudence. In fact, some 
jurisdictions expressly recognize nonbankruptcy claims of equitable 
subordination.54 In Nerox Power System, for example, an Alaskan court found 
 
 52. As sovereign-debt restructuring has grown more commonplace and arguably more important, 
there has been growing interest in developing a sovereign-bankruptcy-type scheme. A number of 
observers believe that sovereigns could borrow money at better rates if they had the benefits of a 
bankruptcy or insolvency law. See NOREENA HERTZ, THE DEBT THREAT 187–94 (2004); Steven 
Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 
956 (2000); Stiglitz, supra note 2, at 42. A bankruptcy or debt-restructuring scheme could reduce the 
power of holdout creditors, enable sovereigns to create priorities, and give sovereigns some protection 
from their creditors. See Bolton & Skeel, supra note 1. The IMF recently proposed a sovereign-debt-
restructuring mechanism. Bratton & Gulati, supra note 1, at 26–43; Gelpern, supra note 2, 398–99; 
Krueger, supra note 1. The IMF proposal attracted some significant opposition and appears to be off 
the table for now. It is important to note, however, that any sovereign-bankruptcy or debt-restructuring 
scheme could include a provision for avoidance of fraudulent transfer or for subordination of claims 
and interests on equitable grounds. 
 53. See supra notes 18–23 and accompanying text. See also Carlson, supra note 13, at 208, 212–13 
(suggesting that the Pepper Court acknowledged that equitable subordination was available under state 
law at the time). 
 54. See Nerox Power Sys. v. M-B Contracting Co., 54 P.3d 791, 794–95 (Alaska 2002) (“The Alaska 
Supreme Court has recognized that the doctrine of equitable subordination, whereby the court may 
‘undo or offset any inequity in the claim position of a creditor that would produce injustice or 
unfairness to other creditors in terms of bankruptcy results,’ can exist outside of the standard 
bankruptcy context.”) (quoting White v. State ex rel Block, 597 P.2d 172, 176 n.13 (Alaska 1979)); 
Haydu v. Wellner, 1994 Conn. Super. Lexis 1105 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994) (considering but refusing to 
apply equitable subordination in a foreclosure action); Shultis v. Woodstock Land Dev. Assocs., 594 
N.Y.S.2d 890 (App. Div. 1993) (subordinating the amount of senior liens that were obtained without 
necessary consent of junior lienholders); Carlson, supra note 13, at 218–19 (discussing cases in which 
equitable subordination was applied outside of bankruptcy); Levitin, supra note 13, at 2 (“Equitable 
subordination is not exclusively a bankruptcy action . . . .”). Carlson argues that equitable 
subordination is actually best thought of as part of fraudulent-transfer law, and “the equation of 
fraudulent transfer and equitable subordination proves that equitable subordination is a remedy that 
can be instituted under state law when appropriate.” Carlson, supra note 13, at 200. See also Gaff v. 
FDIC, 919 F.2d 384, 393 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding that equitable subordination is exclusive to bankruptcy 
law but drawing analogies from the doctrine to determine the content of federal common law); City of 
Parkersburg v. Carpenter, 507 S.E.2d 120, 123 (W.Va. 1998) (noting that equitable subordination is 
“applied ‘almost exclusively’ in bankruptcy proceedings,” and declining to apply the doctrine in the 
case at hand). 
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that investors and insiders had received a fraudulent transfer from an 
undercapitalized debtor. The court subordinated their liens on a coal mine to 
other liens that had been junior.55 Whereas other jurisdictions have concluded 
that equitable subordination is exclusive to bankruptcy law,56 this position is at 
least questionable. It certainly underappreciates the fact that the bankruptcy 
doctrine is a codification of principles derived from equity jurisprudence. In any 
event, it is a wholly separate question whether equitable subordination is 
available outside of bankruptcy in the context of sovereign debt, where 
bankruptcy law is unavailable.57 In that context, the underlying principles of 
equity that gave rise to the doctrine of equitable subordination should apply. If 
so, a sovereign’s creditors—alone or as a group—can assert that obligations of 
the sovereign owed to other creditors who have acted inequitably should be 
subordinated. It is true that equitable subordination is generally associated with 
collective proceedings, but cases applying the doctrine outside of bankruptcy 
suggest that the doctrine is viable in noncollective proceedings as well.58 It 
should be feasible in various contexts to subordinate a claim to other claims 
without the participation of all other claimholders. In the private context, for 
example, this is true when a lienholder asserts that a competing lienholder’s 
claim should be subordinated. Furthermore, it will be feasible for courts to 
apply the doctrine in noncollective proceedings if, as suggested below, the 
formal or practical remedy sought is to avoid or discharge the inequitable claim. 
Creditors asserting equitable subordination would have to show that a 
creditor seeking to enforce a debt (the target creditor) acted inequitably and 
that the complaining creditors were harmed as a result. It should be possible to 
satisfy these elements if the target creditor has extended odious debt.59 The 
primary inequitable aspect of odious debt is that a lender has created an 
obligation for which there was no meaningful value given to the sovereign or its 
citizens. To be sure, the creditor has given value for its claim. But it has given 
value to the sovereign’s government, not to the party or parties who will have to 
repay the obligation. It has extended funds knowing that they would not benefit 
the sovereign itself. This inequitable conduct harms the sovereign’s other 
existing creditors by reducing the value of their competing claims to their 
 
 55. Nerox, 54 P.3d at 794–95. 
 56. See HBE Leasing Corp. v. Frank, 48 F.3d 623 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that equitable 
subordination is exclusively a feature of federal bankruptcy law and thus not part of New York law); 
Paul H. Schwendener, Inc. v. Jupiter Elec. Co., 829 N.E.2d 818, 826 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (“Because the 
principle of equitable subordination is particular to bankruptcy law, it is an issue ‘which can only be 
decided in a bankruptcy setting.’”) (quoting In re Poughkeepsie Hotel Associates Joint Venture, 132 
B.R. 287, 292 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991)); PCL/Calumet v. Entercitement, L.L.C., 760 N.E.2d 633 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2001); Hilo Crane Serv. v. Ho, 693 P.2d 412 (Haw. Ct. App. 1984). See also Levitin, supra note 13, 
at 2, n.5 (noting that some states limit equitable subordination to receivership or liquidation contexts). 
 57. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 58. See supra note 54. 
 59. This article does not consider whether or to what extent the doctrines of equitable 
subordination or fraudulent transfer might be fruitful in other cases involving sovereign obligations that 
would not be considered odious. 
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common debtor’s assets.60 Put another way, extending odious debt could be 
understood as unreasonably or unfairly shifting risk to a sovereign’s non-odious 
creditors. Another inequitable aspect of extending odious debt is that the 
creditor may have thereby given material support to an oppressive regime that 
helped the regime abuse the sovereign’s citizens. 
Such a claim would admittedly differ from paradigmatic cases of equitable 
subordination in certain respects. As most equitable subordination cases arise 
under bankruptcy law,61 the debtors in these cases are insolvent or experiencing 
financial distress, which may assist in establishing that other creditors have been 
harmed. But sovereigns do not become insolvent or experience financial 
distress in the ways that private borrowers do.62 Because the resources 
ultimately available to a sovereign are difficult to measure, it is often not 
possible to discern how the sovereign’s obligations compare to its available 
assets. It may be possible to establish that the sovereign has an unsustainable 
level of debt according to some metric, but doing so will likely be much more 
complicated than establishing that a firm is insolvent. Also, unlike corporate 
borrowers, a sovereign cannot be liquidated and will (almost always) continue 
as a going concern. 
Furthermore, under conventional analysis, the fact that a creditor is an 
insider weighs heavily in determining whether the creditor’s conduct was 
inequitable. A creditor’s actions are more likely to be deemed inequitable if the 
creditor takes advantage of formal or informal levers of control that it has over 
its debtor. Yet sovereigns’ creditors are rarely, if ever, insiders in this sense. 
Private creditors do not appear to perform the same kinds of governance and 
control functions that they tend to perform in the context of private debtors.63 
Some official creditors (sovereigns who extend credit to other sovereigns) may 
exercise a degree of control over their debtors.64 Even if some do perform a kind 
of governance function, however, presumably not all official creditors are rich 
or powerful enough to do so. 
In any event, these factors should not be determinative under existing law. 
Equitable subordination does not appear to require that the common debtor be 
insolvent or be in financial distress. Conduct can be inequitable even if it does 
 
 60. For a discussion of this point, see Feibelman, supra note 2, at 768–69. It is arguable that 
subsequent creditors would not be harmed because they presumably knew of the odious claim. The 
interest rate those creditors demanded should reflect the sovereign’s balance of obligations, resources, 
and assets at the time of their transaction with the sovereign. 
 61. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 62. Financial distress or insolvency in the sovereign context is generally described in terms of 
unsustainability. See Feibelman, supra note 2, at 3–4. See also Robert K. Rasmussen, Integrating a 
Theory of the State into Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1159 (2004). 
 63. See G. Mitu Gulati & George G. Triantis, Contracts Without Law: Sovereign Versus Corporate 
Debt, 75 U. CIN. L REV. 977, 977–78 (2007) (proposing that, although banks may have previously 
monitored sovereign borrowers, creditors currently appear to delegate monitoring and governance 
functions to the IMF). 
 64. See Anna Gelpern, Odious, Not Debt, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 98 (Summer 2007) 
(“For governments financing other governments, policy influence is a central objective, regardless of 
the form the transfer takes.”). 
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not cause financial distress or occur in the shadow of financial distress. Actions 
that increase the probability of default, unnecessarily increase the leverage of a 
firm, or siphon unbargained-for benefits from a common debtor presumably 
impose some actual harm on other stakeholders whether or not they are 
ultimately paid in full. Similarly, control is not a sine qua non of equitable 
subordination.65  Creditors who exercise only limited or no control over their 
debtors can nonetheless act in ways that are inequitable and that harm the 
interests of their debtors and of other stakeholders. The scope of the doctrine in 
the context of sovereign debt should be defined by the traditional power of 
courts of equity to subordinate inequitable claims and interests. Sovereigns or 
their creditors should therefore have significant latitude to argue for 
subordination from first principles—they should have doctrinal room to argue 
that the extension of odious debt is itself inequitable conduct justifying 
subordination.66 
2. Fraudulent Transfer 
There should be little question about whether the doctrine of fraudulent 
transfer is available in the context of sovereign debt. The doctrine has explicit 
foundation outside of bankruptcy law; states’ fraudulent-transfer provisions 
clearly give creditors the authority to pursue other transferees. Sovereigns’ non-
odious creditors have two avenues for asserting fraudulent transfer claims 
against other, potentially odious creditors. First, they might argue that 
extending an odious obligation to the sovereign reflects an actual intent to 
hinder other creditors. Creating an obligation for which no value was 
exchanged harms, and thus hinders, other stakeholders, especially other 
creditors. The value of other creditors’ claims decreases and chances that the 
sovereign will default on their claims increases.67 Extending odious debt may 
thus unreasonably or unfairly shift additional risk to non-odious creditors. The 
doctrinal challenge for parties pursuing this avenue will be establishing that the 
odious debt was extended with intent to hinder other creditors in this way. 
Second, creditors of sovereigns that have arguably unsustainable levels of 
debt might assert that odious debt incurred by the sovereign are constructively 
fraudulent.68 This would obviate the need to prove that a creditor that extended 
odious debt acted with intent to defraud. The complaining creditors would need 
to show that the sovereign did not receive value in exchange for the obligation 
 
 65. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text. 
 66. Cases decided under § 510(c) would be persuasive authority, however, and they could lend 
support to any argument that a particular odious debt should or should not be subordinated. 
 67. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 41, at 851 (noting that a leverage buyout technically “hinders” 
a target firm’s creditors because it “leaves them with fewer assets” with which they might satisfy their 
claims). 
 68. For a similar argument, see Painter, supra note 50, at 123–28. Painter proposes to amend the 
Bankruptcy Code to allow trustees to avoid certain predatory consumer loans as constructively 
fraudulent transfers pursuant to § 548(A)(1)(B). According to Painter, loans designed to erode home 
equity without providing benefit to the borrower should be avoidable in part because they harm the 
borrower’s other unsecured creditors. 
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it incurred while it was financially impaired. An obvious challenge for this 
argument will be showing that the sovereign was financially impaired. This may 
not be a significant obstacle for heavily indebted sovereigns, especially those 
that are able to obtain voluntary debt relief from other private, official, and 
multilateral creditors. 
C. The Remedy 
Assuming that creditors of a sovereign can assert doctrines of fraudulent 
transfer or equitable subordination, there may be some significant formal and 
practical challenges to fashioning a remedy that is not present in the context of 
private debt. The formal problems arise primarily with respect to equitable 
subordination. Subordination of a claim or interest formally alters its priority 
vis à vis other claims or interests; it does not discharge the obligation itself.69 
The remedy for fraudulent transfer, in contrast, is to disallow or avoid the 
obligation.70 Other writers have noted that subordinating a debt is a somewhat 
clunky remedy.71 In the context of private creditors and debtors, the remedy 
does not necessarily have any effect on the creditor whose debt is subordinated; 
the doctrine may fail to provide full compensation to injured parties; and it may 
provide a benefit to parties who were not injured. 
Consider a case in which a creditor acts inequitably in a way that harms one 
creditor but not others.72 Under the conventional approach, bankruptcy courts 
generally subordinate an inequitable claim or interest to all other creditors.73 
Critics of this approach point out that in such cases, the creditors who were not 
harmed may receive a windfall.74 More troubling, the creditor who was actually 
harmed may end up being undercompensated by the conduct.75 The harmed 
creditor can recover no more than the amount of the bad creditor’s claim as a 
result of subordination, and it may have been harmed more than that amount.76 
And if the bad creditor’s claim is subordinated to the claims of creditors it did 
not harm, then the harmed creditor may effectively have to share the benefit of 
subordination with the unharmed creditors.77 Furthermore, if the common 
debtor is solvent, then the harmed creditor will effectively receive nothing from 
 
 69. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 70. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 71. See generally Carlson, supra note 13; Fischel, supra note 12; Levitin, supra note 13. 
 72. Imagine that the harmed creditor might, for example, have decided to lend money to the 
common debtor based on a misrepresentation of fact by the “bad” creditor. The other creditors loaned 
money knowing the fact that had been misrepresented. This example is based on Allstate Life Ins. Co. 
v. Linter Group Ltd., 994 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1993), which is discussed at some length in Carlson, supra 
note 13, at 159. 
 73. See Carlson, supra note 13, at 199–200; Levitin, supra note 13, at 31 (noting that this practice is 
due “in part [to] the difficulties in quantifying the exact harm”). This is what Carlson calls a 
“demotion” approach to equitable subordination. Carlson, supra note 13, at 199–202. 
 74. See id. at 200–02. 
 75. See Levitin, supra note 13, at 8–11. 
 76. See id. at 8–9. 
 77. See id. at 9. 
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the bad creditor, and the bad creditor will presumably recover its debt in full.78 
Finally, the conventional remedy can have the result of penalizing the bad 
creditor, especially if the amount of the subordinated claim is much greater than 
the amount of harm that creditor caused. Equitable subordination is 
conventionally thought to be a compensatory rule;79 punitive damages are not 
generally available in equity.80 
Whatever appeal it may have in other contexts, the conventional approach 
to equitable subordination is particularly inappropriate in the context of 
sovereign debt. Because the sovereign cannot be liquidated, a subordinated 
claim will never be extinguished. Thus, if a claim is found to be inequitable and 
subject to subordination, it will still survive as an obligation against the 
sovereign. Not only will this continue to harm the sovereign, but it will likely 
harm the existing creditors to whom the claim is subordinated. These creditors 
presumably have an ongoing interest in the sovereign’s ability to borrow funds, 
and they have a direct stake in its risk of default. 
For these reasons, the remedy for inequitable conduct by sovereigns’ 
creditors should be to avoid the underlying obligation to the extent that it is 
odious81 and up to the amount of the amount of the subordinated claim.82 As 
should be clear, this is essentially the conventional remedy for fraudulent 
transfers, and it may not seem like subordination at all. However, the practical 
effect of subordination in most cases is the elimination of the “subordinated” 
claim.83 Furthermore, equitable subordination is a discretionary remedy, and 
courts have wide latitude to fashion appropriate remedies.84 It is worth noting 
that the Pepper Court disallowed the subordinated claim in that case, stating, 
“Equity will undo the wrong or intervene to prevent its consummation.”85 This 
approach may have the effect of compensating some unharmed creditors if it 
 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. at 7 (citing Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 13, at 86). Levitin criticizes this view and 
argues that equitable subordination should be considered a penal remedy. 
 80. See Levitin, supra note 13, at 33–34. 
 81. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Mitu Gulati, Partially Odious Debts? 71 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 47 (Autumn 2007) (describing an approach to identify partially odious debts). 
 82. Carlson describes this form of remedy as a kind of assignment; the amount of the claim is 
effectively assigned to the harmed creditor. Carlson, supra note 13, at 202. Taking this approach can 
often be quite difficult, especially if the harmed creditors enjoy different priority and if other creditors 
in the same classes as these creditors are not harmed. See Levitin, supra note 13, at 10. In that case, 
priority rules conflict with targeted subordination. See id. at 10–11. Levitin proposes that equitable 
subordination should be viewed as a quasi-punitive claim. See id. at 30–36. In addition, Levitin argues 
that behavior justifying equitable subordination also generally gives rise to direct causes of action 
between creditors. Id. at 24. In those cases, there should be distribution of a debtor’s assets without 
subordination and injured creditors can then pursue the inequitable ones. Id. at 25. Meanwhile, the 
amounts recovered from the debtor by the inequitable creditors should be kept in a constructive trust 
for the benefit of the injured creditors. Id. at 25, n.103. 
 83. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 84. See Levitin, supra note 13, at 8. Under § 510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, for example, a claim 
or interest can be subordinated to some claims and not others. 
 85. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939). 
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turns out that incurring odious debt does not harm a sovereign’s subsequent 
creditors.86 
The practical challenges of applying any doctrine of lender liability to 
sovereign debt are significant. To appreciate the scope of these practical 
challenges, imagine a grossly simplified scenario in which one or more “good” 
creditors assert that a debt owed to a “bad” creditor by a common sovereign 
debtor is odious. The dispute may occur before the sovereign has begun 
repaying the bad creditor, or it may occur after some or all of the repayment has 
been made. If they can prevail on the merits before payment is made, the good 
creditors may seek to temporarily or permanently enjoin the sovereign from 
repaying the bad creditor. It is doubtful whether such a judgment could 
formally bind the sovereign unless the sovereign is a party to the litigation. Of 
course, the sovereign may be eager to avoid paying the odious obligation, 
especially if the obligation was incurred by a previous regime. The sovereign 
regime may want to repay the obligation, however, perhaps because it wants to 
maintain a relationship with the bad creditor or because it is concerned about 
harming its reputation as a debtor. Thus, even if the judgment could formally 
bind the sovereign, it may be difficult or impossible to enforce such a judgment 
if the sovereign is determined to repay the debt. For this reason, the good 
creditors will presumably prefer to seek a remedy that would enable them to 
reach any proceeds of the odious debt that the bad creditor receives from the 
sovereign. A court could conceivably create a receivership for the benefit of the 
sovereign’s other creditors or impose a constructive trust, forcing the bad 
creditor to hold the proceeds for the benefit of other creditors.87 
Another potential problem for the application of equitable subordination 
and fraudulent transfer to sovereign debt is the existence of pari passu clauses 
in contracts for sovereign debt. These clauses became a ubiquitous feature in 
sovereign-debt contracts over the course of the later part of the twentieth 
century.88 The clauses provide, in effect, that the debt created by contract will 
not be subordinated to any other debt.89 The importance of these clauses has 
increased in recent years as restructuring of sovereign debt has grown more 
common. Creditors have relied on the clause in challenging efforts by 
sovereigns to reward creditors that agree to terms of restructurings and lean on 
creditors who do not.90 In the prominent case of Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Banco 
 
 86. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 87. See Levitin, supra note 13, at 25, n.103 (noting the possible use of constructive trusts). 
 88. For a good summary of this history, see William W. Bratton, Pari Passu and a Distressed 
Sovereign’s Rational Choices, 53 EMORY L.J. 823 (2004); Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari 
Passu Clauses in Sovereign Debt Instruments, 53 EMORY L.J. 869 (2004). 
 89. See generally Bratton, supra note 88. Consider this example of such a clause: “The obligations 
of the Guarantor hereunder do rank and will rank at least pari passu in priority of payment with all 
other External Indebtedness of the Guarantor, and interest thereon.” Id. at 824. 
 90. G. Mitu Gulati & Kenneth N. Klee, Sovereign Piracy, 56 BUS. LAW. 635, 636 (2001). See also 
Buchheit & Pam, supra note 88, at 880–82 (discussing recent cases in which sovereigns’ creditors have 
relied on the pari passu clause). 
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de la Nacion, for example, a creditor successfully asserted the clause to enjoin 
payments to creditors that had opted into Peru’s restructuring.91 
Lee Buchheit and Jeremiah Pam suggest persuasively that the primary 
reason for the common use of these clauses (in both the private and sovereign 
borrowing contexts) is to preclude involuntary subordination under domestic 
laws.92 It is not at all clear, however, whether the clause should preclude the 
operation of doctrines like fraudulent transfer or, especially, equitable 
subordination. After all, the operation of either doctrine depends on a finding 
that the creation of an obligation or interest involved fraud or inequitable 
conduct. Contractual terms are rarely impervious to such conduct. More 
formally, parties are generally not able to contract out of equity jurisdiction; 
precluding equitable remedies because of a pari passu clause would seemingly 
allow them to do so. 
D. Summary 
This Part has explained how creditors might assert doctrines of fraudulent 
transfer or equitable subordination against other creditors who extend odious 
debt to a common sovereign debtor. The doctrines should be available even 
though this litigation will not occur in the context of a bankruptcy filing. 
Fraudulent transfers are prohibited by statute in most states. Extending odious 
debt presumably hinders other creditors, perhaps intentionally so, and may 
constitute constructive fraud if the sovereign debtor is highly indebted. The 
scope of equitable subordination should easily include the power to subordinate 
credit extended with knowledge that it will provide no benefit to the sovereign 
itself. The remedy under either doctrine should be avoidance of the odious 
debt. The forgoing only explores how creditors might employ these doctrines 
against other creditors; it does not consider whether or how the sovereign 
debtor itself might do so. 
III 
NORMATIVE CONCERNS 
If it is possible to apply doctrines of fraudulent transfer or equitable 
subordination doctrines in the context of sovereign debt, this does not mean 
that it is desirable to encourage parties to do so. Lender liability is a surprisingly 
undertheorized topic,93 and we know relatively little about whether doctrines 
like equitable subordination or fraudulent transfer are beneficial and, if so, to 
what extent. As explained below, if courts are scrupulous in subordinating or 
 
 91. 194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 92. See Buchheit & Pam, supra note 88, at 912–17. See also Bratton, supra note 88, at 10; Debra J. 
Schnebel, Intercreditor and Subordination Agreements—A Practical Guide, 118 BANKING L. J. 48, 49 
(2001). 
 93. See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 12, at 133 (“Lender liability cases have led to the creation of an 
area of commercial law that has not been accompanied by the development of a coherent theoretical 
framework establishing the rights of lenders and their duties . . . .”). 
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avoiding only those debts that provide no plausible benefit to sovereign 
debtors, then these doctrines can have a significant effect in reducing the cost of 
non-odious debt.  This should reduce the amount of odious debt extended in 
the first place. This Part considers some of the costs and the benefits of applying 
these doctrines to sovereign debt and proposes that doing so could create a net 
benefit. 
A. Costs 
Criticism of lender liability tends to focus on the welfare effects of the 
doctrine. The doctrines of equitable subordination and fraudulent transfer 
create direct and indirect costs. The direct costs include, for example, increased 
transaction costs and the expense of any resulting litigation. These direct costs 
are not trivial, but they may not be as important as the indirect costs of the 
doctrine. Such indirect costs include increases in the cost of credit or reduction 
in its availability.94 A related potential indirect cost of these doctrines is that 
they may reduce the amount of valuable governance activity that creditors 
would otherwise do. Creditors generally engage in monitoring and governance 
to increase the chances that they will be repaid.95 The threat of lender liability 
presumably increases the cost of this type of governance activity by creditors if 
liability is a function of creditor control. 
Most of the indirect costs described above should be a function of the scope 
of potential liability under the doctrine. The less precise the definition of 
inequitable conduct, the larger the range of behavior by creditors it will likely 
affect and the more uncertainty creditors will face about their potential liability 
under the rule. This should in turn increase the cost of lending and reduce the 
extent to which creditors are willing to risk subordination or avoidance by 
 
 94. See, e.g., Gelpern, supra note 64, at 15 & n.42 (noting that creditors respond to risks of 
subordination and default by lending less to sovereigns than they otherwise would). 
 95. The risks that lenders must take into account when they extend credit include the risk of 
exogenous events and the risk that their debtor will behave in ways that reduce the expected chances of 
recovery. See Fischel, supra note 12, at 133–34. See also Buchheit et al., supra note 2. Creditors price 
these risks to the extent that they are able to do so; to the extent that they cannot precisely predict the 
effects of these risks, they will raise prices enough to ensure that they will not face a net loss in making 
their investment. See Fischel, supra note 12, at 135–36. In this environment, if a creditor can find a way 
to reduce or more precisely price risk, it should enjoy a competitive advantage. Similarly, if a borrower 
can find ways to credibly commit to avoid opportunistic behavior, it can reduce its borrowing costs. See 
Feibelman, supra note 12, at 949 (citing Fischel, supra note 12; Michael C. Jensen & William H. 
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. 
ECON. 305 (1976)). One significant way for creditors to reduce risk is to reduce the ability of borrowers 
to behave in ways that increase the risk of default. They can do so by monitoring and controlling the 
actions of debtors. See Fischel, supra note 12; George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of 
Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1073 (1995). Thus, creditors who lend to 
commercial firms engage in various forms of corporate governance, that is, direct as well as indirect 
control mechanisms. See Feibelman, supra note 12, at 946–53. Not only do these control mechanisms 
arguably reduce the amount that any particular creditor will charge for credit, they appear to increase 
their debtors’ value by reducing inefficient behavior by managers. See Nishant Dass & Massimo Massa, 
Bank-Based Governance: A Tradeoff Between Lower Risk And Greater Information Asymmetry 8 (Fed. 
Reserve Bank of N.Y., Working Paper, 2006), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/ 
conference/2006/fin_intermed/Massa_INSEAD_August18.pdf. 
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engaging in governance. In theory, these costs could be significantly reduced, 
however, if the doctrine provided a careful standard for liability. In so doing, it 
could effectively create safe harbors in which creditors can lend and act without 
fear of incurring liability.96 
At least some of these costs are likely to occur if either equitable 
subordination or fraudulent transfer is applied in the context of sovereign debt. 
The parties would certainly incur direct transaction and litigation costs. And it 
is likely that the new potential liability would create indirect costs, such as an 
overall increase in the cost or availability of sovereign debt. Creditors to 
sovereigns will presumably respond to any new potential liability by passing 
actual or expected costs along to their sovereign borrowers. But these costs can 
be significantly curtailed if courts narrowly apply these doctrines to debt that is 
clearly odious or clearly inequitable on other grounds.97 If the doctrine were 
applied only where there is strong proof that creditors knowingly extended 
credit that provided no benefit to the sovereign, this could create a fairly 
effective safe harbor. Creditors who made efforts to ensure that the regime was 
using their funds to benefit the sovereign would be confident that their 
obligations are not odious. Some uncertainty would surely remain, at least to 
the extent that there is dispute about what the creditor knew or whether a 
particular use of funds provided a benefit to the sovereign. But creditors should 
be able to structure their transactions to reflect that they have reason to believe 
a benefit is being transferred to their sovereign borrowers. If so, the doctrine 
should not significantly increase the cost of credit that falls within the safe 
harbor, if at all; in fact, the cost of non-odious lending may decline if the 
borrower is effectively constrained from engaging in opportunistic behavior or 
from borrowing odious debt. Finally, employing doctrines of equitable 
subordination or fraudulent transfer in the sovereign-debt context should not 
significantly reduce the governance exercised by creditors because most 
creditors who lend to sovereigns apparently do not engage in significant 
governance of their sovereign debtors.98 
B. Benefits 
Credit relationships often create incentives and opportunities for creditors 
to engage in inefficient and harmful behavior toward their debtor and other 
creditors.99 A primary ex post benefit of lender liability is to compensate parties 
that are harmed by such behavior—to return the parties to a status quo ante. In 
some cases, compensatory remedies simply involve wealth transfers from one 
 
 96. See generally Mitchell Berlin & Loretta Mester, Optimal Financial Contracts for Large 
Investors: The Role of Lender Liability (Fed. Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Working Paper No. 00-1, 
2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=213815. 
 97. See supra discussion on page 173. For discussions of optimal definitions or optimal liability in 
the context of odious debt, see, for example, Feibelman, supra note 2, at 758–63; Ben-Shahar & Gulati, 
supra note 81. 
 98. See supra note 63. But see Gelpern, supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 99. See Fischel, supra note 12, at 138–40. 
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party to another. Yet compensatory remedies can theoretically create value. For 
example, they may help reallocate resources back to their highest-valued use. 
Furthermore, they may have other normative benefits—promoting justice or 
fairness, for example. 
The ex ante beneficial effects of equitable subordination and doctrines of 
fraudulent transfer may be more important than any potential ex post benefits. 
By exposing creditors to potential liability, the doctrines should reduce the 
value that a creditor can obtain from fraudulent or opportunistic behavior. And 
by increasing the cost or reducing the benefit of inequitable behavior, this 
potential liability should reduce the incentives for creditors to engage in 
harmful or inefficient opportunistic behavior in the first place. That other 
creditors could assert these doctrines themselves increases the chances that the 
doctrines will have this desirable effect. Creditors can be effective monitors of 
each other.100 They have particular skills at monitoring their debtors’ activities, 
and they usually have information advantages over other parties who might do 
so. By giving creditors the ability to derive direct benefits from exposing each 
others’ inequitable conduct or fraudulent transfers, doctrines of lender liability 
give them additional incentives to monitor each other for such behavior and to 
act upon information they acquire. 
The benefits of doctrines like equitable subordination and fraudulent 
transfer may be significant in the context of odious debt. Giving creditors an 
incentive to monitor each other and to expose the creation of odious obligations 
is particularly important in the context of sovereign debt because other 
governance mechanisms that exist in the private context do not affect sovereign 
debtors. With private borrowers, for example, shareholders, regulators, and 
markets presumably have some beneficial governance effects. In addition, it is 
relatively easy to nudge a private debtor into bankruptcy, where a broad range 
of enforcement mechanisms kick in. Such mechanisms are largely absent from 
the realm of sovereign debt. Credit rating agencies and public institutions like 
the International Monetary Fund play some monitoring and governance roles.101 
Citizens of the sovereign borrower may have some power to elect new leaders 
or to stage revolts. But these various governance mechanisms may be weaker 
than those that obtain in the context of private borrowers, which would help 
explain why sovereigns are able to incur significant amounts of odious debt. 
Thus, if the doctrines of equitable subordination and fraudulent transfer were 
clearly available, this might spur creditors to play a more aggressive role in 
monitoring the transactions of their sovereign debtors and in effectively 
policing the behavior of other creditors who engage in inequitable conduct. 
 
 100. See id. 
 101. See Gulati & Triantis, supra note 64. Under the leadership of Paul Wolfowitz, the World Bank 
has apparently increased its efforts to monitor sovereign regimes for corruption. See Jai Damle, The 
Odious Debt Doctrine After Iraq, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139 (Autumn 2007) (discussing 
Wolfowitz’s plan to make assistance from the Bank conditional on anticorruption policies). 
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There are reasons to believe that creditors will respond to these incentives. 
In recent years, creditors have grown considerably more assertive in litigating 
claims against sovereigns.102 It may be that not all of this litigation is productive, 
especially if it hinders the ability of sovereigns to conduct restructuring efforts.103 
More recently, and perhaps more promisingly, there have been some 
indications that sovereigns’ creditors will in fact pursue other creditors to 
recover funds that should not have been transferred from their common debtor. 
The case of Kensington International, Ltd. v. BNP Paribas, S.A.,104 is a 
prominent example of this inter-creditor dynamic. Kensington, a creditor to the 
Republic of Congo, sued BNP Paribas and others, alleging that the French bank 
had helped the Congolese government hide assets from which BNP Paribas 
itself had been repaid. An initial case was dismissed on procedural grounds, and 
Kensington is now suing BNP and other defendants pursuant to the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.105 
C. Net 
As others have noted, it may not be possible to determine as a matter of 
theory whether the costs or benefits of lender liability predominate.106 There is 
some tentative evidence, however, that the benefits outweigh the costs in the 
context of some private commercial transactions. A recent study suggests that 
optimal contracts between commercial firms and large investors would include 
the ability to apply equitable subordination against the large investor.107 If so, 
the doctrine will provide a net benefit, at least with respect to the two parties to 
the lending contract. 
 
 102. See Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043 (2004); Defaulted Sovereign Debt? Litigate It!, N.Y. 
L.J., Feb. 22, 2005, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1108992913591 (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2007). Prominent examples include Elliott Associates, the pari passu case noted above. 
See supra note 91 and accompanying text. The Argentinean debt crisis has generated a significant 
amount of litigation. See, e.g., H.W. Urban GmbH v. Republic of Argentina, No. 02 Civ. 5699, 2004 WL 
307293 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2004) (certifying a class of creditors suing the sovereign); Lightwater Corp., 
Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 02 Civ. 3804, 2003 WL 1878420 (S.D.N.Y. April 14, 2003) (rejecting 
the sovereign’s request for a stay of litigation to negotiate with creditors). Other recent cases include 
Af-Cap, Inc. v. Republic of Congo, 383 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2004) (defining tax revenue and royalties 
received by the sovereign as “commercial activity” and subject to attachment because it was transferred 
to another creditor); Turkmani v. Republic of Bolivia, 193 F. Supp. 2d 165 (D.D.C. 2002); Hirshon v. 
Republic of Bolivia, 979 F. Supp. 908 (D.D.C. 1997). Most recently, Donegal International successfully 
sued Zambia to recover on $55 million in Zambian obligations that Donegal had purchased at a steep 
discount from Romania in 1999. See Zambia Pays ‘Vulture Fund’ $15m, BBC NEWS, Apr. 24, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6589287.stm. 
 103. See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text. 
 104. No. 03602569 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Jan. 24, 2005) (unpublished opinion, on file with author). 
 105. See Kensington, Int’l, Ltd. v. Société Nationale Des Pétroles Du Congo, No. 05 Civ. 5101 
(LAP) 2006 WL 846351 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2006) (denying defendants’ motions to dismiss). 
 106. See Fischel, supra note 12, at 140 (“Whether the increased risk of lender misbehavior created 
by loan covenants imposes costs that outweigh the benefits from limiting debtor misbehavior cannot be 
resolved at the theoretical level. The answer will vary depending on the situation and particular 
covenant involved.”). 
 107. See Berlin & Mester, supra note 96, at 1. 
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There are reasons to be optimistic that the net effects of unleashing 
equitable subordination or fraudulent transfer in the context of sovereign debt 
could also be positive. If these doctrines succeed in motivating creditors to 
begin to act as monitors of their sovereign debtors, this could be a rather 
dramatic benefit. Furthermore, if these doctrines create a reliable safe harbor 
for non-odious debt, this might limit the costs of the new source of liability. The 
cost of credit within the safe harbor should decrease; borrowers should be all 
the more motivated to structure their transactions to fall within the safe-harbor 
protection. Together, these factors could help significantly reduce the amount 
of odious debt outstanding, which could yield significant positive externalities 
for the populations of many sovereigns that are, or have been, afflicted with 
oppressive regimes. But these benefits will largely depend on the ability of 
courts to narrowly and consistently apply the doctrines. Admittedly, this may be 
asking too much of a judicial system, which by its nature is ad hoc and 
susceptible to idiosyncratic factors of particular cases. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
This article proposes that creditors of a sovereign might employ the 
doctrines of equitable subordination or fraudulent transfer to pursue other 
creditors who extend odious debt to their common debtor. Creditors should be 
able employ such doctrines in nonbankruptcy proceedings pursuant to state law 
in most jurisdictions. Employing these doctrines against sovereign debtors 
would certainly unleash some costs. These costs might be dramatic, especially if 
courts are not careful to employ the narrowest definition of odious debt or to 
provide reliable safe harbors. Still, these doctrines might yield net benefits by 
reducing the amount of odious debt extended, perhaps reducing the overall cost 
of sovereign debt. Even if they would yield net benefits, however, it would still 
remain to be seen whether such benefits were greater than those of alternative 
doctrines and institutions that might be used to address the problem of odious 
debt. 
